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by their complete lack of regard for
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great Warpath, Cohen reminds us, were parts
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean
more linked us to Europe than it
insulated us from it. Moreover, these
wars exposed us to a full range of
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century
European warfare, from set-piece
battles to what could be called unconventional and secret warfare. They
also brought the full horror of war to
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary
European notion that the United States
did not become “the territory of war”
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed,
terror in the form of murderous raids
on New York and New England villages
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues
that the American appetite for the kind
of unconditional surrender pursued by
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had
its grounding in the eighteenth-century
American intention to destroy the enemy polity that was Canada. More than
that, America’s wars to attach Canada
to itself were wars for the freedom of
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’
as the Continental Congress had written
to the doubtful habitants of Canada
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and
Japan, occupied and transformed by
armies that combined, in paradoxical
degree, thoroughness in defeating an
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve,
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly
good read in addition to being highly
thoughtful and often revelatory.
KEN JENSEN

McLean, Virginia
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Historians have long argued about the
true mechanism behind a ninety-year
period of relative peace in Europe, a
period that began with the end of the
Napoleonic wars and became known
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years
critics have questioned both aspects
of this term—whether the period was
actually as peaceful as its title suggests
and whether that peace really was,
in large part, due to Great Britain’s
overwhelming and imposing commercial, industrial, financial, and naval
might. Through a searching analysis of
political decision making during three
different crises within an eight-year
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a
developed and published version of the
author’s Cornell University dissertation,
seeks to add weight to the notion that
Britain did indeed use the strength and
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effective deterrent force during this time.
The author explains that on three separate occasions between 1838 and 1846
(Canadian trade and border disputes
with the United States, 1838–42; the
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first
Opium War of 1839–42), British politicians, in particular Lord Palmerston,
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or
to use, naval power to further discrete
British interests on the world stage and
to coerce and influence the activities
of their main rivals in Europe. In each
case, while the immediate aim was
obviously to benefit British regional
activities, each was undertaken with
an eye to preserving the broader peace
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and stability of the international order
as a whole. In other words, Britain’s
defensive “status quo” policy was
implemented by operationally offensive
threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke
clearly shows that the British politicians
well understood that if they failed to
respond to some of these lesser challenges (the Chinese opium war being a
prime example), over time they risked
weakening their ability to influence their
major adversaries in the future, in situations where the stakes might be higher.
During the course of her analysis,
Matzke takes issue with established
scholarship holding that the relative
inactivity of the Royal Navy during this
period was indicative of its comparative weakness within Europe as a whole.
On the contrary, she depicts an early
Victorian navy that was well up to the
task, possessing shipbuilding, logistics, and manpower support superior
to that of any competitor. It was this
depth of capability that represented
its major coercive value, particularly
to the European rivals, often allowing what she terms demonstrations of
Thomas Schelling’s “skillful nonuse of
military force.” Moreover, the British
instinctively knew all this, giving them
great confidence in their brinkmanship
with rivals. The case of the successful
coercion of France in the Egyptian/
Syrian crisis is a notable example.
Matzke’s work is meticulously researched, using a wide array of contemporary archival material that focuses
on the collected thoughts and writings
of the main players involved, material taken from their personal papers,
letters, and diaries. The weakness in
her work lies in the admittedly implicit
assumption that this short period can
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be taken as truly illustrative of the
situation throughout the whole of
the Pax Britannica. Arguably, Matzke
has found a narrow historical period
where thesis and facts align, but she is
less convincing over the broader time
frame, and more work would likely be
necessary to settle this point decisively.
Less important, but nonetheless still
of concern, is her rather rosy picture
of the reliability of the steamships of
the day. As John Beeler has forcefully
demonstrated, truly globally deployable, oceangoing steamers would have to
wait until the late 1880s to be realized;
their limitations until then, in terms of
maintenance requirements and support
while deployed, facts of which navies
were only too well aware, do not come
across well. That said, this is an important work that successfully advances
the study of British naval policy into
an earlier period. When taken together
with the more established scholarship
of the late Victorian and Edwardian
periods, it moves us closer to a more
complete understanding of British
efforts to wield naval power in support of a global free-trading system.
As such, it has timeless relevance.
ANGUS K. ROSS

Naval War College
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